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THE NECESSITY OF “RIGHT TO TRAVEL”
ANALYSIS IN CUSTODIAL PARENT
RELOCATION CASES
David V. Chipman*
Mindy M. Rush**

INTRODUCTION
The most complex issue facing judges today during post divorce modiﬁcations
is proposed relocations by the custodial parent. “As our society has become
increasingly mobile and migratory, the number of relocation cases has continued
to expand at an astounding rate.”1 Throughout America, courts facing this
issue have not found any uniform response to this relocation quagmire. Some
states place the burden on the non-custodial parent to demonstrate why such a
relocation is against the best-interest of the child.2 Other states place the burden of

* Assistant District Counsel, U.S. Army, Omaha District. J.D. 2005, University of Nebraska
College of Law. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors. This article does not
represent the views of the United States Army. Special thanks to Teresa Cassidy and David Shields
for all of their time spent editing this article.
** Monzón Law, P.C., L.L.O. J.D. 2007, University of Nebraska College of Law. The views
expressed in this article are those of the authors. This article does not represent the views of the law
ﬁrm of Monzón Law, P.C., L.L.O.
1

See In re Marriage of Burgress, 913 P.2d 473, 480 (Cal. 1996); David M. Cotter, Oh, the
Places You’ll (Possibly) Go! Recent Case Law in Relocation of the Custodial Parent, 16 DIVORCE LITIG.
152, 152 (2004).
2
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(d) (2007); W.
VA. CODE § 48-9-403(d)(1) (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.481 (West 2009); Chesser-Witmer v.
Chesser, 117 P.3d 711, 717 (Alaska 2005); Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 662–63
(Ark. 2003); Tarlan v. Sorensen, 702 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); In re Marriage of
Robinson, 53 P.3d 1279, 1282–83 (Mont. 2002); Flynn v. Flynn, 92 P.3d 1224, 1228 (Nev. 2004);
Evans v. Evans, 530 S.E.2d 576, 578–79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Berens v. Berens, 689 N.W.2d
207, 212 (S.D. 2004); Bates v. Texar, 81 S.W.3d 411, 421–22 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Hudema v.
Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491, 498 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage of Horner, 93 P.3d 124, 130
(Wash. 2004); Harshberger v. Harshberger, 117 P.3d 1244, 1252 (Wyo. 2005).
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proof on the custodial parent to prove the relocation is in the child’s best interest.3
Furthermore, several states do not shift a burden to either parent.4 Additionally,
a few of these state courts have created qualiﬁed standards, where the custodial
parent must prove a legitimate reason for the relocation before the best interest
standards are even entertained by the court.5 To confuse matters even more,
jurisdictions have restricted these varying relocation standards to apply only when
certain conditions are met, such as when the custodial parent relocates out-ofstate, relocates beyond a given distance from the residence of the non-relocating
parent, or only lives a certain distance away from the non-custodial parent.6

3
ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(G) (2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 729(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.13
(2009); Roberts v. Roberts, 64 P.3d 327, 331 (Idaho 2003); In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d
232, 235 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004);
Kinter v. Nichols, 722 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Me. 1999); Grew v. Knox, 694 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2005); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 233 (N.J. 2001); Paul v. Pagnillo, 786 N.Y.S.2d
662, 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Maynard v. McNett, 710 N.W.2d 369, 373 (N.D. 2006); In re
Marriage of Colson, 51 P.3d 607, 612 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 440
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Surles v. Mayer, 628 S.E.2d 563, 576 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
4
FLA. STAT. § 61.13001 (2008); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146–47 (Colo.
2005); Bodne v. Bodne, 588 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re Marriage of Bradley, 899
P.2d 471, 473 (Kan. 1995); Braun v. Braun, 750 A.2d 624, 636 (Md. Ct. App. 2000); Jaramillo v.
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 307–10 (N.M. 1991); Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 254 (R.I. 2004);
Latimer v. Farmer, 602 S.E.2d 32, 34–35 (S.C. 2004).

IND. CODE § 31-17-2.2-5 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 461-A:12 (2005); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998); Rosenthal v. Maney,
745 N.E.2d 350, 358–59 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 647 N.W.2d 577,
581 (Neb. 2002).
5

6
See ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2003) (providing a standard that applies to any out-of-state
moves or moves that are more than 60 miles from the non-custodial parent in-state); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-408(B) (2008) (providing a standard that applies to any out-of-state moves or
moves that are more than 100 miles from the non-custodial parent in-state); IOWA CODE § 598.21D
(2009) (providing that it can be considered a material change of circumstance to modify custody
if the custodial parent relocates more than 150 miles away from the child’s residence when custody
was originally awarded); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.1(4) (2009) (providing that relocation tests
only apply if the custodial parent is moving out of state or if moving 150 miles away from the child’s
residence in-state); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.19-A, § 1657(2) (2009) (providing a standard that
only applies if the custodial parent moves out-of-state or more than sixty miles from either parent’s
residence in-state); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31(1) (West 2009) (providing that the relocation
standard does not apply (1) if the custodial parent does not move more than 100 miles away from
the child’s residence at the time of the original custody order or (2) if the parents’ homes are more
than 100 miles apart at the time of the move); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07 (2009) (providing
that relocation is permitted if the non-relocating parent has moved out-of-state or more than ﬁfty
miles from the other parent’s residence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(a) (2007) (providing that
the relocation standard only applies when the custodial parent moves out-of-state or 100 miles from
the non-relocating parent in-state); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-37(1) (2008) (providing that the
relocation standard applies if the custodial parent relocates out-of-state or 150 miles from the child’s
residence in-state); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.327(1)(a)(2) (West 2009) (providing that the relocation
standard applies if the custodial parent relocates out-of-state or 150 miles from non-relocating
parent); In re Marriage of Seitzinger, 775 N.E.2d 282, 288 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is not necessary

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/11

2

Chipman and Rush: Necessity of Right to Travel Analysis in Custodial Parent Relocat

THE NECESSITY OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL

2010

269

With these differing standards and burdens of proof governing custodial
parent relocations, exactly whose interests are these courts ultimately trying to
protect? Are these courts protecting the state’s interest in maintaining contact
with the child? Are they protecting the autonomy of the custodial parent or
the non-custodial parent’s relationship with the child? Or, maybe these courts
are purely protecting the best interest of the child? Regardless of the articulated
protected interest, the underlying policy behind the relevant standard for custodial
parent relocation must be analyzed because a rigid application of these relocation
standards can allow for absurd results. Conversely, if courts continue to produce
a hodgepodge of relocation decisions, the predictability and stability that lawyers
and litigants should expect from recent decisions is absent, resulting in more
relocation litigation.7 The recent Nebraska Court of Appeals decision Curtis v.
Curtis is the quintessential example of an appellate court’s rigid application of a
state’s common law relocation standards, thereby producing absurd results.8 In
Curtis, the Nebraska Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s order, allowing
a custodial mother’s relocation of 17.6 miles from the non-custodial parent.9 The
basis of the Nebraska Court of Appeals’s decision was the ﬁnding that the mother’s
desire to relocate to live with her boyfriend was not one of the pre-determined
“legitimate reasons” that a custodial parent is allowed to relocate out of the State of
Nebraska.10 However, after the mother’s relocation in Curtis, the father’s visitation
remained the same and the mother’s standard of living improved.11 Thus, the

for a custodial parent or a parent with primary physical custody to obtain permission from a court
before moving to another location in Illinois.”); McLaughlin, 647 N.W.2d at 591–92 (Stephen, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a custodial parent does not need to seek permission to relocate within the
state).
7
See Katherine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law Institute
Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 467, 471–72 (1999); Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional
Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 41 (1996) (citing DeBeaumont v. Goodrich, 644 A.2d
843, 857–58 (Vt. 1994) (Johnson, J., dissenting)).
8

759 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008).

9

Id. at 273.

10

Id. (“Clearly, [the mother’s] desire to move from Nebraska is not based on an employment
opportunity for her . . . and is not based on remarriage. [The mother’s] sole reason for wanting to
move is her desire to continue living with [her boyfriend] as she has been doing since moving out
of the marital home. Because [the boyfriend] is selling his house in Fall City where [the mother and
child] have been living, [the mother and child] have to ﬁnd someplace else to live. However, [the
mother] has not demonstrated a legitimate reason as to why their new home has to be with [her
boyfriend] in Missouri.”).
11

Id. Testimony revealed the father’s visitation would remain the same after the mother’s
relocation to Missouri and that the boyfriend’s new home in Missouri would provide “newer and
more spacious housing” for the mother and child than the mother would be able to afford on her
own. Id. It is also worth noting that the reason the mother could not obtain housing on her own was
because her credit was ruined when the father allowed the marital home to be foreclosed on, which
he was awarded in the divorce and ordered to hold the mother harmless against the mortgage. Id. at
272.
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only logical conclusion is that the Nebraska Court of Appeals has made a judicial
determination that the State of Nebraska has a policy of maintaining its children
within the jurisdiction.12 However, such a policy ignores the custodial parent’s
constitutional right to travel.
This article will discuss the underlying policies behind relocations standards
in various jurisdictions, such as those articulated in Curtis.13 This article will
also analyze a custodial parent’s constitutional right to travel, and review how
balancing the custodial parent’s right to travel with other competing interests
would avoid some unnecessary relocation litigation.14

I. CUSTODIAL PARENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A custodial parent’s constitutional right to interstate and intrastate travel is
rarely analyzed by courts in relocation cases.15 The current paradigm is ﬁnding
courts and legislatures moving away from presumptions and rights based analysis,
and toward an emphasis on the elusive “child’s best interest” standard.16 However,
as analysis of Curtis will demonstrate, a failure by courts to recognize and analyze
a parent’s constitutional right to travel will, at times, yield absurd results.
Although state courts often fail to acknowledge an individual’s right to travel
when deciding whether to approve a custodial parent’s relocation, the right to
travel has been unequivocally recognized by the United States Supreme Court.17

12
Since in Curtis the child was not harmed and the father’s visitation schedule was not altered
by the mother’s relocation to Missouri, the only logical conclusion can be that the State of Nebraska
has a policy of keeping its children within its borders. See, e.g., Vanderzee v. Vanderzee, 380 N.W.2d
310, 311 (Neb. 1986) (“Generally, the best policy in divorce cases is to keep minor children within
the jurisdiction . . . .”).
13

See infra notes 160–67 and accompanying text.

14

See discussion infra Parts I, II, and III.

15

See Lance Cagle, Have Kids, Might Travel: The Need for a New Roadmap in Illinois Relocation
Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 259–60 (2005); Arthur B. LaFrance, supra note 7, at 3; Tabitha
Sample & Teresa Reiger, Relocation Standards and Constitutional Considerations, 10 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 229, 237 (1998); Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias
in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527,
613 (2001).
16

See Storrow, supra note 15, at 637.

17

See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in the text
of the Constitution. Yet the ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is ﬁrmly
embedded in our jurisprudence.”) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966));
Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (“The right of interstate travel has
repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom.”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 629 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (“This
Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of
personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth
of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
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In Saenz v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court declared that an individual’s
right to interstate travel is guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.18 Justice John
Paul Stevens, in his majority opinion, stated:
The word “travel” is not found in the text of the Constitution.
Yet the “constitutional right to travel from one State to another”
is ﬁrmly embedded in our jurisprudence. Indeed, as Justice
Stewart reminded us . . . the right is so important that it is
“assertable against private interference as well as governmental
action . . . a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed
by the Constitution to us all.”19
The United States Supreme Court has further stated that the right to travel
encompasses the right to “migrate, resettle, ﬁnd a new job, and start a new life.”20
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that a person’s
right to interstate travel cannot be impinged on absent a compelling state interest.21
Appellate courts in at least thirty different states have, at a minimum, discussed
a custodial parent’s constitutional right to interstate travel in the context of a
custodial parent’s relocation.22 Of these appellate courts, courts in Wyoming and

movement.”). For a complete a review of the constitutional right to travel, see Nicole I. Hyland, On
the Road Again: How Much Mileage is Left on the Privileges or Immunities Clauses and How Far Will it
Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 187 (2001); see also Gregory B. Hartch, Wrong Turns: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Right to Travel Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 458 (1995) (“[N]o Supreme
Court justice in American history has voiced opposition to the general concept of a right to travel.”).
18

526 U.S. at 502.

19

Id. at 498 (citations omitted).

20

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.

21

Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 253.

22

See Everett v. Everett, 660 So.2d 599, 601 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); Pollock v. Pollock, 889
P.2d 633, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); In re Marriage of Fingert, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1575, 1582
(1990); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 138 (Colo. 2005); Azia v. DiLascia, 780 A.2d 992,
995 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
Tetreault v. Tetreault, 55 P.3d 845, 851 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002); Bartosz v. Jones, 197 P.3d 310, 314
(Idaho 2008); In re Marriage of Manuele, 438 N.E.2d 691, 764 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982); Baxendale v.
Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (Ind. 2008); Wohlert v. Toal, No. 02-1981, slip op. (Iowa. Ct. App.
Aug. 27, 2003); Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Burch v. Burch, 814
So.2d 755, 759 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Braun v. Headey, 750 A.2d 624, 628–29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000); Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Mass. 2006); Beaton v. Beaton, No. 202753,
1998 WL 1993003, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151,
156 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Mont. 1986); Reel v.
Harrison, 60 P.3d 480, 482 (Nev. 2002); Murnane v. Murnane, 552 A.2d 194, 198 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 302–03 (N.M. 1991); McRae v. Carbno,
404 N.W.2d 508, 509 (N.D. 1987); Rozborski v. Rozborski, 686 N.E.2d. 546, 548 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996); Clapper v. Clapper, 578 A.2d 17, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d
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California have speciﬁcally recognized a parent’s constitutional right to interstate
travel includes the constitutional right to intrastate travel as well.23 Furthermore,
most of the courts that have discussed a parent’s constitutional right to travel,
have recognized that an individual’s right to travel, as a fundamental right, can
only be restricted in furtherance of a compelling state interest.24
Most of the courts addressing a custodial parent’s right to travel have
acknowledged that this right is implicated when a custodial parent attempts to
relocate with the child.25 However, courts have not agreed on how to balance the
right to travel with the rights of the non-custodial parent in the context of the best
interest of the child analysis.26 There appear to be ﬁve classiﬁcations developed by
courts when addressing the right to travel in the framework of custodial parent
relocation: (1) the right to travel is absolute; (2) creation of a pure balancing
test of the right to travel with other compelling state interests; (3) ﬁnding the
best interest of the child is a compelling state interest which does not require
balancing the parent’s right to travel; (4) ﬁnding the non-custodial parent’s right
to visitation is a compelling state interest which does not require a balancing of
the right to travel; and (5) ﬁnding the parent’s right to travel is not implicated in
the context of custodial parent relocations.

A. Right to Travel is Absolute
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s interpretation of a custodial parent’s right
to travel elevates the relocating parent’s right to travel over other competing
interests.27 In Watt v. Watt, the custodial mother desired to move from Upton,
Wyoming to Laramie, Wyoming to attend a pharmacy program at the University
of Wyoming, a distance of approximately 270 miles.28 In a modiﬁcation action,

721, 724 (R.I. 2003); In re C.R.O., 96 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Lane v. Schenck,
614 A.2d 786, 789 (Vt. 1992); Momb v. Ragone, 130 P.3d 406, 412–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006);
Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 61 (W. Va. 1985); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 614–16 (Wyo.
1999).
23

See In re Marriage of Fingert, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1582; Watt, 971 P.2d at 614–16; see also
Hyland, supra note 17, at 242–53 (“[The right to travel] was granted federal protection against state
abridgement by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who intended to protect fundamental
rights from state abridgement. Consequently, the right to travel is guaranteed protection against
state abridgement within the borders of the state by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the states may not abridge the right to intrastate travel.”).
24

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280 (“As a fundamental right, the right to
travel interstate can only be restricted in support of a compelling state interest.”).
25

See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142–43.

26

See id. at 143.

27

See Watt, 971 P.2d at 615–16.

28

Id. at 612.
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the District Court for Weston County changed custody to the father.29 In reversing
the trial court’s decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court held:
The custodial parent’s right to move with the children is
constitutionally protected, and a court may not order a change in
custody based upon that circumstance alone. Some other change
of circumstances, together with clear evidence of the detrimental
effect of the other change upon the children, is required. Such a
circumstance necessarily would have to be sufﬁciently deleterious
to the welfare of the children that by itself it would serve as
a substantial and material change in circumstances even in the
absence of a relocation.30
In Watt, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that when reviewing a relocation
case, the reviewing court “must remember that the best interest of the child
standard was applied at the time of the initial custody award.”31 In essence, the
best interest standard cannot be revisited in Wyoming due to the relocation of a
parent because of the parent’s constitutional right to travel.32

B. Pure Balancing Test
In Colorado, New Mexico, Indiana, Maryland, and Florida, appellate courts
have adopted what appears to be a pure balancing test between a custodial
parent’s constitutional right to travel, rights of the non-custodial parent, and the
best interest of the child, without any burdens or presumptions to any of the
aforementioned interests.33
In In re Marriage of Ciesluk, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that
a majority time parent’s right to travel was not the only fundamental right
at stake.34 The Ciesluk court, citing the United States Supreme Court case of
Troxel v. Granville, held that “a minority time parent has an equally important
constitutional right to the care and control of the child.”35 The Colorado Supreme

29

Id.

30

Id. at 616–17.

31

Id. at 614.

32

See Emilia P. Wang, Unenumerated Rights—Are Unenumerated Rights a Viable Source for the
Right to Intrastate Travel? Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999), 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1053, 1056–59
(1999).
33
See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142; Fredman, 960 So.2d at 57–59; Baxendale,
878 N.E.2d at 1259; Braun, 750 A.2d at 628–29; Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 304–06.
34

113 P.3d at 142.

35

In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65

(2000)).
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Court further found that intertwined with parents’ competing constitutional rights
is concern for the best interest of the child.36 Thus, the Ciesluk court concluded
that “relocation disputes present courts with a unique challenge: to promote the
best interest of the child while affording protection equally between a majority
parent’s right to travel and a minority parent’s right to parent.”37 Interestingly,
the Colorado Supreme Court noted that “in the absence of demonstrated harm
to the child, the best interest of the child standard is insufﬁcient to serve as a
compelling state interest overruling the parents’ fundamental rights.”38 Ciesluk
recognized that a trial court in Colorado must consider and make ﬁndings based
on the twenty-one factors set out in Colorado Statute § 14-10-129 for a majority
time parent’s relocation.39 Furthermore, Ciesluk required that both parents share
equally the burden of demonstrating how the child’s best interests will be served.40
The Ciesluk court held that in a relocation case, it must balance the competing
constitutional rights of each parent with the child’s best interests, with neither
party having a presumption or burden of proof. The Colorado Supreme Court
in Ciesluk held that this balancing test was required for a trial court to properly
rule on the relocation of a majority time parent.41 Subsequent to the Colorado
Supreme Court’s holding in Ciesluk, appellate courts in Indiana and Florida have
adopted the pure balancing analysis found in Ciesluk.42
The Ciesluk court borrowed this balancing test from the New Mexico
Supreme Court.43 In Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, the New Mexico Supreme Court not
only considered both the majority time parent’s right to travel and the state’s
concerns in protecting the best interests of the child, but also the minority time
parent’s right to maintain close association and frequent contact with the child.44
In Jaramillo, the parents had joint legal custody and the mother had “physical
custody” of the child.45 The mother requested to move with the child to New
Hampshire because of new employment and to be closer to her family.46 The trial
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. (noting that no Colorado court has held that the best interests of the child are a
compelling state interest that obviates the need to balance the competing constitutional rights of
parents).
39

Id. at 148.

40

Id. at 147.

41

See id. at 148.

42

Fredman, 960 So.2d at 57–59; Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1259 (“In short, we agree with the
recent well-reasoned opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court is to balance these
considerations.”).
43

Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 304–06.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 301. The court deﬁned “physical custody” as meaning the parent in which the child
resides “more than half the time.” Id. at 304.
46

Id. at 302.
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court applied a presumption in favor of a custodial parent’s relocation and granted
the mother’s move to New Hampshire.47 After the New Mexico Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case for a new determination of the best interest of
the child based on a presumption against the move, the New Mexico Supreme
Court reviewed the case.48 The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that a
parent wishing to relocate should not be burdened by an adverse presumption
because it “unconstitutionally impairs the relocating parent’s right to travel.”49
It also determined that the non-primary parent should not be burdened with a
presumption in the relocating parent’s favor, because the resisting parent has a
fundamental liberty interest in parenting.50 Instead, the New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that:
[N]either parent will have the burden to show that relocation of
the child with the removing parent will be in or contrary to the
child’s best interests. Each party will have the burden to persuade
the court that the new custody arrangement or parenting plan
proposed by him or her should be adopted by the court, but that
party’s failure to carry this burden will only mean that the court
remains free to adopt the arrangement or plan that it determines
best promotes the child’s interests.51
The Jamarillo court found that although the best interests of the child are of
primary importance in making this determination, these interests alone do not
automatically overcome the constitutional rights of the parents, which must be
weighed against each other in the best interest analysis.52 The Maryland Court
of Special Appeals has directly adopted the Jamarillo court’s balancing test for a
parent’s right to travel.53

C. Best Interest of Child is Controlling State Interest
The appellate courts of Minnesota, Idaho, West Virginia, Alabama, Arizona,
Kansas, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Nevada, Montana, Massachusetts, and
Washington all recognize that a parent’s right to travel is a fundamental right
protected by the United States Constitution and should be protected when

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 305.

50

Id. at 306.

51

Id. at 309.

52

See id.

53

Braun, 750 A.2d at 635.
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the parent desires to relocate.54 However, these appellate courts found that the
furtherance of the best interests of children may constitute a compelling state
interest worthy of reasonable interference with a parent’s right to travel.55 In
essence, these appellate courts still recognize and analyze a parent’s right to travel,
but these courts simply “elevate the child’s welfare to a compelling state interest,
thereby obviating the need to balance the parents’ competing constitutional
rights.”56
The Montana Supreme Court was one of the ﬁrst courts to recognize and
analyze a custodial parent’s right to travel in the context of a relocation action.57
In In re Marriage of Cole, the Montana Supreme Court announced for the ﬁrst
time that the United States Constitution protects the custodial parent’s right to
interstate travel and such a right is clearly implicated when the custodial parent
desires to relocate with his or her child.58 However, the Cole court also noted
that “[w]e believe that furtherance of the best interest of a child, by assuring the
maximum opportunities for the love, guidance and support of both natural parents,
may constitute a compelling state interest worthy of reasonable interference with
the right to travel interstate.”59 The Cole court concluded its analysis with a word
of caution, stating that “any interference with this fundamental right must be
made cautiously, and may only be made in furtherance of the best interest of the
child.”60
In these state appellate courts, placement of the burden of proof to
demonstrate whether the relocation is in the best interest of the child plays a
factor in determining the weight the court places upon the parent’s right to

54
See Everett, 660 So.2d at 601–02; Pollock, 889 P.2d at 635 (“The competing rights at the
heart of this case are the Mother’s right to travel and the Father’s right to maintain a meaningful
relationship with his child. These rights must be adjusted in accordance with the best interests of
the child.”); Bartosz, 197 P.3d at 322–24; Carlson, 661 P.2d at 836; Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 521
(holding the right of parent to relocate with child is subject to the State’s power to promote child’s
best interests); LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163; In re Marriage of Thorner, 190 P.3d 1063, 1068–69
(Mont. 2008); Reel, 60 P.3d at 482–84; Murnane, 552 A.2d at 198; Momb, 130 P.3d at 412–14;
Africano, 837 A.2d at 724; Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d at 61 (“The paramountcy of child welfare may,
however, supersede the right to travel.”).
55
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280 (“We believe that furtherance of the best
interests of a child, by assuring the maximum opportunities for the love, guidance and support of
both natural parents, may constitute a compelling state interest worthy of reasonable interference
with the right to travel interstate.”).
56

In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 144 (citing LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163).

57

In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280.

58

Id. (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634, overruled on other grounds by Edelman, 415 U.S. at

59

Id. (citing Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773 (Idaho 1984)).

60

Id.

671).
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travel.61 When a court places this burden on the non-moving parent, the parent
must necessarily provide sufﬁcient proof that a travel restriction is, in fact, in the
best interest of the child in order to sufﬁciently defeat the custodial parent’s right
to travel.62 Whereas, in states where the custodial parent must bear the burden of
demonstrating that the relocation is in the best interest of the child, the parent’s
right to travel is even more encumbered because the custodial parent begins on
unequal footing in an attempt to enforce his or her constitutional right to travel.63

D. Non-Custodial Parent’s Right to Visitation is Controlling
In Illinois, New Jersey, and North Dakota, appellate courts have found that
the protection of the non-custodial parent’s right to visitation would justify a
compelling governmental interest to restrict the custodial parent’s right to
travel.64 These jurisdictions hold that the non-custodial parent’s right to visitation
with the child is a compelling state interest, thereby precluding the court’s
need to balance such right against the custodial parent’s right to travel.65 These
jurisdictions, in particular, appear to be guided by a general principle that the
well-being of the minor child is often dependent upon maintaining a loving and
supportive relationship with the non-custodial parent.66 In determining that
the non-custodial parent’s right to visitation is a compelling state interest, the
North Dakota Supreme Court, in McRae v. Carbno, recognized this relationship
interest, stating that “in our state, there is a legally recognizable right of visitation
between a child and the noncustodial parent which is considered to be in the best

61

Of these aforementioned states, Minnesota, Washington, and West Virginia place the
burden on the non-removing parent to demonstrate that the best interest of the child requires that
the child not be removed from the state, whereas Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, and New Jersey require
the moving custodial parent to demonstrate the move is in the child’s best interest. Kansas, Nevada,
Rhode Island and Montana do not place a burden on either parent. See supra notes 2–4.
62

See In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280.

63

See Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 307 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972))
(“[Placement of burdens in relocation cases] needlessly risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parent and child.”). But see Bartosz, 197 P.3d 310 (stating that placing the burden
on the moving parent to show that it is in the best interest of the child to relocate is not tantamount
to placing a presumption against relocation). See also Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?: Examining
the Consequences of Post-Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 124 (2007) (“Legal tests favoring
the relocating parent often, but not always, resulted in more favorable decisions for the relocating
parent.”).
64

See In re Marriage of Manuele, 438 N.E.2d at 695; Murnane, 552 A.2d at 198 (ﬁnding a
compelling state interest is “the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent and the interest of the
child in maintaining a close relationship with that parent”); McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 509–10.
65

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Manuele, 438 N.E.2d at 695 (“[A] person’s right to travel may
be restricted if done for the promotion of a compelling government interest. Here, the protection
of petitioner’s rights of visitation would justify a reasonable residential restriction as a condition of
respondent’s custody of the children.”).
66

See, e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 223–33 (N.J. 2001).
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interests of the child.”67 The McRae court also found that placing a burden upon
the custodial parent to relocate with the child did not unnecessarily interfere with
the custodial parent’s right to travel.68 In justifying this presumption in favor of
the non-custodial parent, the McRae court stated:
The statutory recognition of visitation rights between a
child and the noncustodial parent is consistent with placing
the burden upon the custodial parent to show that moving the
child to another state is in the child’s best interest. We conclude
that there is no presumption that a custodial parent’s decision
to change the child’s residence to another state is in the child’s
best interests. We are unpersuaded that it would be consistent
with our statutes or otherwise appropriate to adopt such a
presumption, and we refuse to do so.69
Although these appellate courts recognize the right to travel in the context of
relocation cases, these courts found that a non-custodial parent’s right to visitation
with his or her child is a compelling state interest, which can trump the custodial
parent’s right to travel. These courts further ﬁnd no harm in placing the burden
on the moving parent to show it is in the child’s best interest to move with the
custodial parent.70

E. Custodial Parent’s Right to Travel Not Implicated in Relocation
The Texas Court of Appeals has held that removal cases do not implicate a
parent’s right to travel because the custodial parent is never actually prohibited
from outright travel.71 Rather, the parent is only prohibited from traveling
with the child.72 In In re C.R.O., the parents were divorced in Georgia, where
the mother was awarded primary custody of the two minor children.73 A few
months later, the mother remarried and moved to Fort Bend County, Texas to

67

McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 509.

68

See id.

69

Id. at 509–10 (citation omitted).

70

Each of the three states place the burden to prove the relocation is in the child’s best interest
upon the moving custodial parent. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/609(a) (2008); Baures, 770 A.2d at
218; Maynard v. McNett, 710 N.W.2d 369, 371 (N.D. 2006).
71
In re C.R.O., 96 S.W.3d 442, 452 (Tex. App. 2002); Bates v. Texar, 81 S.W.3d 411, 435–36
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Lenz v. Lenz, 40 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 79
S.W.3d 10 (Tex. 2002).
72
See, e.g., Lenz, 40 S.W.3d at 118 (holding because the domicile restriction is only upon the
child, and not the custodial mother, the mother is free to travel anywhere she desires and her right
to travel is unabridged).
73

96 S.W.3d at 445.
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live with her new husband. The father moved to Florida to begin a new job.74
Approximately ﬁve years after moving to Texas, the mother notiﬁed the father
of her intent to relocate with their two children to Hawaii so her new husband
could take a position with a substantial pay increase.75 The father ﬁled a motion
requesting the children’s domicile be restricted to Fort Bend County.76 After ﬁling
his motion, the father rented an apartment in Fort Bend County, quit his job in
Florida and began working in Texas.77 The 387th District Court in Fort Bend
County, Texas granted the father’s motion and restricted the children’s domicile to
“Fort Bend County and the contiguous counties so long as [the father] continues
to reside in that area.”78 The mother appealed, arguing inter alia, that the trial
court’s order violated her constitutionally protected right to travel.79 However, the
Texas Court of Appeals dismissed the mother’s argument and upheld the district
court’s domicile restriction, stating that “[t]he domicile restriction imposed by the
trial court applied only to the children and did not affect [the mother’s] ability to
exercise any of the aforementioned rights.”80
The Michigan Court of Appeals has also refused to analyze a custodial
parent’s right to travel.81 In the unpublished decision of Beaton v. Beaton, the
mother appealed a trial court’s order of joint physical custody which required the
children be enrolled in the Marysville School District.82 The mother contended
that a number of provisions within the court’s order violated her constitutional
right to travel, including the court’s provision that the children must be kept in
the Marysville School District. The court summarily found that a parent’s right to
travel was not worth analyzing, stating “given the compelling interest of Michigan
in the ‘best interest of the children,’ as they are affected by the dissolution of their
parents’ marriage . . . we are aware of no characterization of a constitutional ‘right
to travel’ that would enable such a right to prevail over a judicial ‘best interests’
determination.”83 Similarly, in Clapper v. Clapper, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court found the custodial parent’s right to travel did not warrant analysis when
determining the parent’s ability to relocate and concentrated solely on the best
interests of the child.84

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 445–46.

78

Id. at 446.

79

Id. at 452.

80

Id.

81

Beaton v. Beaton, No. 202753, 1998 WL 1993003, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998).

82

Id. at *1.

83

Id. at *4.

84

578 A.2d at 21.
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In Lane v. Schenck, the custodial mother notiﬁed the non-custodial father
that she was planning to relocate with the children from Vermont to Iowa to
attend law school.85 The father moved the Caledonia Family Court to change the
custodial arrangement to one which would prohibit the mother from relocating
with the children.86 The court responded to the father’s motion by prohibiting
the mother to relocate any further than a drive of “four hours one way” from
the father.87 The mother appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court’s order,
which conditioned her right to continued custody on the requirement she remain
within a four hour drive from the father’s residence, violated her constitutionally
protected right to travel.88 The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Caledonia
Family Court’s decision, thus allowing the mother to relocate to Iowa.89 However,
the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the mother’s constitutional right to travel
argument, stating:
We do not view the issue as falling solely within the right to
travel, since either party is free to move wherever the party
wants. The issue actually involves a determination of the proper
parental custodian, given the best interests of the children. While
freedom of movement from state to state is implicated, it is
unnecessary to elevate the issue presented here to a constitutional
dimension. Where a parent lives in relation to the other parent
is just one factor of many to be considered in formulating a
custody decision. Certainly, the visiting parent could not defeat
the custodial parent’s rights and responsibilities by asserting a
constitutional right to travel.90
In essence, the Vermont Supreme Court has ruled it unnecessary to perform a
constitutional analysis of a parent’s right to travel, because the best interest of the
child is the paramount issue before the court in a relocation case.
Perhaps the most troubling relocation analysis comes from the Louisiana
Court of Appeals.91 In Bezou v. Bezou, the custodial mother left the state of
Louisiana with her children to take a position as an attorney in Washington,
D.C.92 The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans modiﬁed the custody
arrangement, awarding custody of the youngest of the two children to the father

85

614 A.2d at 787.

86

Id. at 787–88.

87

Id. at 788.

88

Id. at 789.

89

Id. at 789–92.

90

Id. at 789.

91

436 So. 2d 592 (La. Ct. App. 1983).

92

Id. at 593.
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still residing in Louisiana.93 At trial, the mother argued that custody modiﬁcation
based on her relocation would interfere with her right to travel.94 In the trial
court’s order, the judge stated the following:
She accuses this court of “placing a chill on her constitutional
right to travel.” She does not accept the notion that she placed a
chill on her right to travel when she bore and started to raise two
children. She does not want this court to restrict her legal right
to travel. She does not realize that her right to travel, though not
legally, was from a practical point of view restricted when she
chose to play the role of mother years ago.95
Upon examination of the record, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana found no
abuse of discretion by the trial judge, and ignored the constitutional right to travel
issue entirely.96

II. ANALYSIS OF OTHER COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
There are a plethora of reasons given by courts when justifying the restriction
on a custodial parent’s ability to relocate with his or her child. However, the
underlying cause behind each justiﬁcation is safeguarding the welfare of the
child.97 Therefore, almost every relocation case is couched in terms of whether or
not the move is in the child’s best interest.98 In large part, courts have found two
reasons to justify a majority of restrictions on custodial parent’s relocation: (1) it
is the best interest of the child to live within the particular state, and (2) the move
detrimentally affects the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce Children: Relocation, The Constitution
and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 25 n.195 (1985) (quoting Bezou v. Bezou, No. 81-11606
(C.D.C. Orleans June 3, 1983)).
96

Id. (citing Bezou, 436 So. 2d at 593).

97

Edward Sivin, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel,
12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 350 (1981).
98

See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 739 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (remanding a case because
the trial court failed to make sufﬁcient ﬁndings regarding whether the custodial parent’s proposed
move would be in the child’s best interest).
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A. State’s Interest in Protecting Welfare of the Child by Maintaining Child
Within Jurisdiction
Several jurisdictions have made both judicial and legislative policy stating it
is generally best to keep minor children within the state.99 To further this policy,
several states place a burden on a custodial parent to prove the relocation is in
the best interest of the child before the parent can relocate outside the state.100
Additionally, every state except Michigan requires the custodial parent request
permission before relocating outside the state with the child.101 The United States
Supreme Court has held that a state has the “right” and the “duty” to protect its
minor children.102 Federal courts agree, ﬁnding that “a state seeks to further a
legitimate state interest when it sets out to protect the welfare of its citizens of
tender age.”103
Courts often justify, in part, that denying a custodial parent’s petition to
relocate on the basis of maintaining the child within the state allows the state
to protect the child and assists the court in exercising its jurisdiction over the
child.104 However, the fallacy behind this logic is simple: no state can claim that
another state could not equally protect the child.105 In reality, a state’s interest in
keeping the child within the state is based upon two overriding issues: (1) the
antiquated concerns of parental kidnapping and parental forum shopping, and
(2) protecting the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent.
Residential restrictions on the custodial parent have historically been justiﬁed
as necessary to enforce the home state’s custody decree.106 There was traditionally
great concern that if a custodial parent was allowed to move, the custodial parent
would petition the court of the new state and nullify the former state’s order.107

99

See, e.g., Vanderzee v. Vanderzee, 380 N.W.2d 310, 311 (Neb. 1986) (“Generally, the best
policy in divorce cases is to keep minor children within the jurisdiction, but the welfare of the child
is the paramount consideration.”).
100

See supra note 3.

101

See supra note 6.

102

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).

103

Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff ’d in part, 545 F.2d
1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
104

Murnane v. Murnane, 552 A.2d 194, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).

105

LaFrance, supra note 7, at 137.

106

Sivin, supra note 97, at 351.

107

See, e.g., Stuessi v. Stuessi, 307 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (“Generally speaking,
it is against the policy of the law to permit the removal of a minor child to another jurisdiction,
due principally to the fact that upon entry of a decree of divorce, the child becomes the ward of the
court, and that upon its removal to another state, any subsequent order made pursuant to the court’s
continuing jurisdiction may be difﬁcult, if not impossible, of enforcement.”).
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However, this concern is outdated. All ﬁfty states, the District of Columbia, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted some form of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), ﬁrst promulgated in 1968.108 In 1997, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in an effort to rectify
shortcomings perceived in the UCCJA.109 To date, forty-six states, along with the
District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have adopted the UCCJEA.110
Both the UCCJA and the UCCJEA provide that a state has jurisdiction to make
an initial custody determination if it is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceedings for the past six months, or was the home
state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from the state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live the state.111 Furthermore, with only a few exceptions, both the
UCCJA and the UCCJEA do not allow a state court to modify a child custody
determination made by a court of another state, unless the other state court
acquiesces.112
Further justifying the containment of minor children within the state is the
concern about parental kidnapping. However, on December 20, 1980, Congress
enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980. Section 8 of the Act
provides for recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees and
limits a court’s ability to modify such decrees.113 The combined results of the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the UCCJA / UCCJEA are that child
custody decrees are enforceable in sister states, and courts are severely limited
in their ability to modify those decrees. Thus, the purpose of maintaining and
enforcing decrees is no longer a compelling reason for imposing residential
restrictions on custodial parents.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (1968) [hereinafter UCCJA]; see also Kelly Gaines
Stoner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)—A Metamorphosis
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 75 N.D. L. REV. 301, 302 (1999); David
Carl Minneman, Annotation, Construction and Operation of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, 100 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 2 (2002).
108

109
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997) [hereinafter UCCJEA].
See also In re McCoy, 52 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App. 2001).
110
Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, A Few Facts About The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp (last visited Nov.
11, 2009); UCCJEA Adoptions, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/docs/UCCJEAadoptions.pdf (last
visited Nov. 11, 2009) lists states that have adopted the Uniform Act.
111

UCCJA § 3; UCCJEA § 201.

112

UCCJA § 14; UCCJEA § 203.

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6–10, 94 Stat.
3568–73 (1980) (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
113
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In relocation cases, it is evident from each court’s rhetoric that they are
protecting the state’s interest in the child’s welfare. However, courts only act when
the non-custodial parent opposes the custodial parent’s proposed relocation.
Hence, the reality is that the state is often attempting to act as the agent of the
non-custodial parent.114 Such is the case, for instance, in Murnane v. Murnane,
where the custodial mother argued the trial court’s prohibition against her move
to Orlando, Florida violated her constitutional right to travel.115 At the time of
the divorce, the mother lived in Pennsylvania and the non-custodial father lived
in New Jersey, where the parties’ homes were approximately forty miles from each
other.116 The mother subsequently sought permission of the court to move to
Florida with the child. In rejecting the mother’s argument that her right to travel
was infringed by restricting her from moving to Florida, the New Jersey Superior
Court stated:
In a case such as the present one, the State has a strong
interest in properly adjudicating custody in order to assure the
welfare of a minor. If the two parties claiming custody each
proposes to live in a different jurisdiction, the court is bound
to take that fact into consideration. If the court has adjudicated
custody on the assumption of residence within New Jersey so
as to protect, among other things, the visitation rights of the
noncustodial parent and the interest of the child in maintaining
a close relationship with that parent, the court must necessarily
have the right to prevent the custodial parent from thereafter
moving the child to a location whose distance would thwart the
interests of the child and of the noncustodial parent.117
Clearly, the Murnane court found it permissible to act as an agent for the
non-custodial parent. However, only the non-custodial parent has a legal right
to visitation with his or her child, as the state itself should have no interest in
visitation rights. To hold otherwise would allow the state to act as an agent for the
non-custodial parent and ﬁnd that the state’s interests are adverse to the custodial
parent. The state’s interest should only be adverse to that of a parent’s in cases
when the parent’s actions or inactions are causing harm to the welfare of the
child.118 Therefore, without any demonstration of endangerment to the child, a

114

LaFrance, supra note 7, at 91.

115

552 A.2d at 198.

116

Id. at 196.

117

Id. at 198.

118

See In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the traditional
right of a parent to establish a home and raise his or her children is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; this right can only be interfered upon by the state to protect
the child from endangerment).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/11

18

Chipman and Rush: Necessity of Right to Travel Analysis in Custodial Parent Relocat

THE NECESSITY OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL

2010

285

state itself would not have a compelling interest to prohibit the custodial parent
from relocating outside of the state and, thus, could not inhibit the parent’s right
to travel.

B. Visitation Rights of Non-Custodial Parent
A custodial parent’s right to travel is not the sole constitutional right involved
in a relocation case.119 The United States Supreme Court has held that parenting is
a fundamental right that cannot be signiﬁcantly diminished or abrogated without
a compelling state interest.120 The right of parents to control the upbringing of
their children was ﬁrst acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in
1923 in Meyer v. Nebraska.121 Some courts have found that the non-custodial
parent has an equally important right to the care and control of the child as the
custodial parent, and such right should be included when considering whether
to allow the custodial parent to relocate with the minor child.122 However, the
constitutional protections of parental rights are likely inapplicable in a dispute
between two natural parents.123 For instance, in Arnold v. Arnold, the father argued
that the trial court violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution when he was awarded
102 days a year in parenting time with his children during divorce proceedings.124
Speciﬁcally, the father claimed the unequal physical placement of his children
deprived him of a fundamental liberty interest in equal participation in the raising
of his children.125 In rejecting the father’s constitutional argument, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that a parent’s fundamental right to the care and custody of
his or her children is inapplicable to a dispute between two natural parents after a
divorce.126

119
David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1461, 1474–84 (2006).
120
Margaret F. Brinig, Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody at Divorce?, 65 LA. L.
REV. 1345, 1351 (2005) (citing several United States Supreme Court cases, including Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
121

262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).

122

See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65
(“The liberty interest at issue in this case—interest of the parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children—is perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by this Court.”)).
123

Meyer, supra note 119, at 1478.

124

679 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).

125

Id.

126

Id. at 299; see also McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 75, 808–09 (Md. 2005); In re R.A.,
891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005); Grifﬁn v. Grifﬁn, 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (Va. Ct. App. 2003);
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 507 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1986).
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A parent’s right to visitation with his or her minor child is “considered natural,
inherent, and arising from the very fact of parenthood.”127 However, so far, no
United States Supreme Court case has recognized visitation as a fundamental
interest of non-custodial parents entitling them to substantial due process.128
Although not considered a constitutional right, courts have consistently found
that a non-custodial parent has a “right” to visitation with his or her child.129 In
particular, courts have often allowed or disallowed a custodial parent’s request to
relocate on the basis of whether or not the non-custodial parent could maintain
a “meaningful” relationship with his or her child after relocation.130 Furthermore,
at least one state court has held that a non-custodial parent has a “constitutionally
protected ‘inherent right’ to a meaningful relationship with his children.”131
Although courts have found that the non-custodial parent has a right to
visitation with his or her child, these same courts have found that maintaining
existing visitation patterns should not be the sole justiﬁcation precluding a custodial
parent’s relocation.132 Perhaps no court has laid out the difﬁculties involved in
relocations cases better than in Gruber v. Gruber, where the Pennsylvania Superior
Court stated:

127
Ayelet Blechet-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to Relational Right, 16 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2009) (citing In re Marriage of L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 789 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990)); accord Chandler v. Bishop, 702 A.2d 813, 817–18 (N.H. 1997).
128

Blechet-Prigat, supra note 127, at 3.

129

Elizabeth Weiss, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family Autonomy: An Abridgment of Parents’
Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1085, 1092–97 (2000); see, e.g., Murnane, 552
A.2d at 198 (ﬁnding that the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent and the interest of the child
in maintaining a close relationship with that parent can trump a custodial parent’s constitutional
right to travel and relocate to another state with the minor child).
130

See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 601 (1999) (allowing a mother to
move from Omaha to Denver, a distance of over 500 miles, because a reasonable schedule allowed the
father to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child even though the father had never missed
any of his visitation and he spent time with the child throughout the year equal to approximately
one-half of all the days in the year); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 919 (N.D. 1997) (ﬁnding that
moving from North Dakota to Arkansas still allowed for a father to have a meaningful relationship
with his child); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 149 (N.Y. 1996) (allowing a mother to move
2 1/2 hours away because it would still allow the father to have “meaningful access” to his son);
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 710 A.2d 610, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (not allowing a mother to move
from Pennsylvania to South Carolina because such move “could very well thwart the development
of a healthy relationship between [the child] and her father”); see also In re Marriage of Leyda, 355
N.W.2d 862, 866 (Iowa 1984) (“[The Iowa Supreme Court] has long recognized the need for a
child of divorce to maintain meaningful relations with both parents.”).
131

Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991).

132

See Hicks v. Hicks, 388 N.W.2d 510, 515 (1986) (holding a reduction in visitation does
not necessarily preclude a custodial parent from relocating for a legitimate reason); see also Auge v.
Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983); D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. 1976).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/11

20

Chipman and Rush: Necessity of Right to Travel Analysis in Custodial Parent Relocat

2010

THE NECESSITY OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL

287

“Every parent has the right to develop a good relationship
with the child, and every child has the right to develop a good
relationship with both parents.” The task of this court is to
sacriﬁce the non-custodial parent’s interest as little as possible
in the face of the competing and often compelling interest of a
custodial parent who seeks a better life in another geographical
location.133
While no court has found that a non-custodial parent has a constitutionally
protected right to a set visitation schedule, the Florida Supreme Court has held a
non-custodial parent does have a constitutionally protected right to a meaningful
relationship with his or her child.134 Moreover, in the 1978 case Quillon v. Walcott,
the United States Supreme Court found the “relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected.”135 In Franz v. United States, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a father’s right to
the companionship of his son is constitutionally protected.136 Furthermore, some
state courts have held that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
to visitation with his or her children.137 The bottom line is that visitation rights
provide the only means for a non-custodial parent to maintain a meaningful
relationship with a child.138 Given this truth, it must be acknowledged by courts
that a non-custodial parent has a constitutional right to visitation with his or her
child, absent a compelling reason to deny such right.139
Generally, a parent’s ability to visit his or her child is limited only by the
welfare of the child.140 Furthermore, most states hold as a matter of policy, it
is generally in the child’s best interest for the child to have regular contact with
133

583 A.2d 434, 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citations omitted); Blechet-Prigat, supra note
127, at 5 (“Visitation provides the only means to enable a non-custodial parent to maintain a
relationship with the child. In essence, denying visitation is tantamount to terminating the parental
rights of the non-custodial parent. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of parent’s visitation rights
remains debatable . . . .”).
134

Schultz, 581 So.2d at 1293.

135

434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).

136

707 F.2d 582, 594–602 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

137

In re C.J., 729 A.2d 89, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745

(1982)).
138

Blechet-Prigat, supra note 127, at 5.

139

See, e.g., Hoversten v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 4th 636, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[T]he relationship between parent and child is so basic to the human equation as to be considered
a fundamental right, and that relationship should be recognized and protected by all of society, no
less jailers. Interference with that right should only be justiﬁed by some compelling necessity, i.e., a
parent dangerously abusing a child . . . .”) (quoting In re Smith 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 968–69 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980)).
140

See, e.g., McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So.2d 494, 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“Visitation
with a child should never be denied as long as the visiting parent conducts himself or herself,
while in the presence of the child, in a manner which will not adversely affect the child’s morals
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both parents.141 However, there can be no assertion that a non-custodial parent is
constitutionally entitled to a given schedule of visitation. Moreover, in situations
of relocation by the custodial parent, courts have often noted the ﬂexibility of a
non-custodial parent’s visitation when allowing the custodial parent to relocate.142
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
Visitation is a ﬂexible arrangement that the parents and the
court can modify as circumstances require without undermining
the relationship of the child and the noncustodial parent. . . .
Visitation arrangements depend on circumstances, such as the
proximity of the child’s residence to that of the noncustodial
parent and the needs of the child. In short, visitation arrangements
reﬂect a variety of approaches to encouraging a relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent—they do not
reﬂect the existence of a noncustodial parent’s inviolate right to
any particular arrangement.143
Therefore, a non-custodial parent’s right to visitation must be balanced with
the custodial parent’s right to travel. In doing so, the court must consider the
possible adverse effect of elimination or curtailment of a child’s association with
non-custodial parent; in this context, reasonableness of an alternative visitation
arrangement should be assessed and the fact that visitation by non-custodial
parent will be changed to his or her disadvantage cannot be controlling.144

C. Best Interest of the Child
The “best interest” doctrine “affects the placement and disposition of children
in divorce, custody, visitation, adoption, the death of a parent, illegitimacy
proceedings, abuse proceedings, neglect proceedings, crime, economics, and all
forms of child protective services.”145 In custodial relocation cases, the cardinal
or welfare.”). But see Dawn D. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 952 P.2d 1139, 1148 (Cal.
1998) (holding that the biological father of a child born to woman married to another man did not
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being allowed to form a parental relationship
with his child).
141
See, e.g., Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1993) (stating the law seeks to assure that
the child have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after a divorce).
142
See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 331 (Tenn. 1993) (noting that a non-custodial
parent is not entitled to a ﬁnite parenting schedule); see also Rosenthal v. Maney, 745 N.E.2d 350,
357–58 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing that a court must realize that after divorce a child’s
subsequent relationship with both parents can never be the same as before the divorce and that a
child’s quality of life is provided in large part by the custodial parent).
143

Long v. Long, 381 N.W.2d 350, 356 (Wis. 1986) (citation omitted).

144

See Rosenthal, 745 N.E.2d at 361.

145

Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 337 (2008).
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consideration for the courts is almost always exclusively based upon what the
court determines is in the “best interest” of the child.146 Even though the best
interest of the child is the central issue in custodial parent relocations, there is
a divergence among courts and commentators as to whether or not the “best
interest of the child” standard constitutes a compelling state interest to interfere
with a parent’s constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court proclaimed it the “highest order” of a
state to protect the interest of minor children.147 Furthermore, several courts and
commentators contend that the best interest of the child is a compelling state
interest which may infringe upon the fundamental liberties afforded to parents
under the Constitution.148 Speciﬁcally, in the context of custodial parent relocation,
several courts have found that the best interest of a child is a compelling state
interest justifying infringement upon a parent’s constitutional right to travel.149
However, there are a growing number of courts and commentators who
opine that the child’s best interest standard is not a compelling state interest
that may infringe upon a parent’s constitutionally protected rights.150 One
commentator has argued: “The ‘best interests’ of the child is simply too broad and
amorphous a concept to qualify categorically as a compelling state interest.”151 In
In re Ciesluk, a parental relocation case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
“[s]hort of preventing harm to the child, the standard of ‘best interest of the
child’ is insufﬁcient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent’s
fundamental rights.”152 The Ceisluk court gave the following as a reason for its
holding:

146
See, e.g., Weaver v. Kelly, 18 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“In determining
whether to grant the custodial parent’s motion to remove a child from the state, the paramount
concern is the best interest of the child.”).
147

Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).

148

See, e.g., In re Joseph, 416 N.E.2d 857, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); McGuire v. Morrison,
964 P.2d 966, 968 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1995);
Brinig, supra note 120, at 1358.
149
See Everett v. Everett, 660 So.2d 599, 601–02 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); Pollock v. Pollock,
889 P.2d 633, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Bartosz v. Jones, 197 P.3d 310, 322 (Idaho 2008); Carlson
v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Braun v. Headey, 750 A.2d 624, 632 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2000); Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 521 (Mass. 2006); LaChapelle v. Mitten,
607 N.W.2d 151, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Mont.
1986); Murnane, 552 A.2d at 198; Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 309 (N.M. 1991); Africano
v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 730 (R.I. 2003); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 61 (W. Va. 1985).
150

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 144–45 (Colo. 2005); In re Parentage of
C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d 405, 410 (Wash. 2005); Mizrahi v. Cannon, 867 A.2d 490, 497 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005); LaFrance, supra note 7, at 135–47; Meyer, supra note 119, at 1490.
151

Meyer, supra note 119, at 1490.

152

113 P.3d at 144 (quoting In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d at 410).
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[F]rom a practical standpoint, adopting the best interests of the
child as a compelling state interest to the exclusion of balancing
the parents’ rights could potentially make divorced parents
captives of Colorado. This is because a parent’s ability to relocate
would become subject to the changing views of social scientists
and other experts who hold strong, but conﬂicting, philosophical
positions as to the theoretical “best interests of the child.”153
Moreover, it is questionable that a court can truly determine what is in a child’s
best interest with any level of precision. Perhaps the Tennessee Supreme Court put
it best, stating that “[t]he goal of facilitating the child’s best interest is certainly a
noble one, but the notion that courts can ever know with any certainty what will
truly be in a given child’s best future interest is perhaps unrealistic.”154
There are strong arguments that the best interests of a child is insufﬁcient as
a compelling state interest which may infringe upon a parent’s constitutionally
protected liberty interests. Nonetheless, upon closer examination, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the best interest of children standard is a compelling
state interest. Children are our nation’s most protected resource, and, thus,
protecting the best interests of a child must certainly be a compelling state
interest.155 Certainly, if a custodial parent’s move greatly affected the child’s
physical or mental well-being, there would be a compelling state interest to
infringe upon a custodial parent’s constitutionally protected right to travel.156
However, courts must recognize that prohibiting a custodial parent’s relocation
purely upon the best interest standard “can potentially mean nothing more than a
marginal advantage over closely matched alternatives.”157 Thus, in cases involving

153

Id. at 145; John C. Duncan, Jr., The Ultimate Best Interests of the Child Enures From
Parental Reinforcement: The Journey of Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240, 1254 (2005) (“The
illusive ‘best interest of the child’ has become a cliché. Without a concrete legal deﬁnition, it has
been subject to overuse and misuse. Too often, the ‘best interest of the child’ is determined by
dispassionate third parties relying on empirical data gathered by social scientists.”); Timothy M.
Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittmann, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations: A
Call for Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 193, 193 (2005).
154

Taylor, 849 S.W.2d at 326.

155

See, e.g., Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 (“The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order
to protect the interests of minor children . . . .”); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983)
(“[T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart to the responsibilities they have assumed [for the
minor children].”); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (“[T]he State has an
urgent interest in the welfare of the child . . . .”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)
(holding that when the interests of the parent and the child conﬂict to the point where the child is
threatened with harm, the state has an obligation to protect the welfare of the child).
156
See, e.g., Dozier v. Dozier, 334 P.2d 957, 959 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (prohibiting a change
in residence because the medical evidence showing that the child’s asthmatic condition would be
exacerbated by the proposed move).
157

Meyer, supra note 119, at 1490.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/11

24

Chipman and Rush: Necessity of Right to Travel Analysis in Custodial Parent Relocat

THE NECESSITY OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL

2010

291

a custodial parent’s proposed move, a court must balance the best interests of the
child with the custodial parent’s right to travel and the non-custodial parent’s
visitation rights, in determining whether or not the custodial parent can relocate
with the child. To do otherwise, is not only unwise, it is a potential violation of
the custodial parent’s constitutionally protected right to travel.158

III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT
ON CUSTODIAL PARENT’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL
It is well-recognized that a United States citizen has the right to travel between
states.159 Moreover, this right to travel is a constitutionally protected fundamental
right.160 As a fundamental right, the right to travel interstate can only be restricted
in support of a compelling state interest.161 The only two compelling state
interests worthy of restricting a custodial parent’s constitutional right to travel
are the best interests of the minor child and the non-custodial parent’s visitation
rights.162 Furthermore, even if the travel restriction is only placed upon the child,
the parent’s right to travel is affected because “a legal rule that operates to chill the
exercise of the right, absent a sufﬁcient state interest to do so, is as impermissible
as one that bans exercise of the right altogether.”163 Despite the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated citizens’ constitutionally
protected right to travel, trial courts are still reluctant to consider the parent’s
right to travel in the context of geographical relocations. The legal issues of
parental relocation are perpetual, as one in six Americans move at least once every
year and the “average American” makes 11.7 moves in a lifetime.164 As noted by
several courts, the simple truth is that mobility is a fact of life.165 Therefore, it is
paramount that the issue of a parent’s right to travel is raised in relocation cases,
and that such right is balanced with the compelling state interests of the child’s
best interest and the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights.

158

Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody
Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker
Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499–50 (1990) (stating that the best interest standard, without
more, “risks unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits manipulation and abuse, and allows a level
of judicial discretion that is difﬁcult to reconcile with an historic commitment to the rule of law”).
159
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
160

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1999).

161

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.

162

See supra Part II.

163

Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 306 (N.M. 1991) (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631).

164

In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 147 (Colo. 2005) (citations omitted).

165

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Day, 314 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1982); In re Marriage of Bard,
603 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Marez v. Marez, 350 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Neb. 1984).
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A custodial parent’s request to relocate often means moving hundreds, if not
thousands, of miles away from the non-custodial parent.166 However, there are
several cases where the custodial parent wishes to move a much lesser distance
from the non-custodial parent. Although the custodial parent’s right to travel has
not been given as a basis, several courts and state legislatures have enacted rulings
and laws indicating that a parent should be allowed to move with the child a
small distance away from the non-custodial parent. This is certainly because these
judges and legislatures have recognized that the best interest of the child and the
non-custodial parent’s visitation rights are not substantially affected by relatively
minor relocations.167 For instance, the South Dakota Supreme Court in Fossum v.
Fossum found that a custodial mother’s seventy mile intrastate relocation was not
a substantial change of circumstance warranting a modiﬁcation of custody.168 The
court upheld the well-reasoned proposition of law that “insigniﬁcant geographical
changes generally will not constitute a substantial change in circumstances.”169
Legislatures in Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Tennessee,
Utah, and Wisconsin have passed laws allowing custodial parents to relocate
without permission of the court. These laws usually require the relocation be
in-state and within a certain distance from the non-custodial parent’s residence,
ranging from 60 miles to 150 miles.170
In Curtis v. Curtis, the custodial mother’s proposed move was out-of-state
from Fall City, Nebraska, where the father resided, to Big Lake, Missouri.171
Given the close proximity of the two cities, the proposed out-of-state move only
placed the child 17.6 miles away from the non-custodial father.172 The mother’s
move to Big Lake would still allow the child “to go to the same school, and [the
father’s] visitation schedule [would] not change.”173 Furthermore, the mother
also volunteered to provide transportation of the child to and from the father’s
residence, so that the father would not have to drive to Missouri to pick up the
child.174 However, in Nebraska, the threshold question when deciding parental
166
See, e.g., Curtis v. Curtis, 759 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (“[M]ost removal
cases involve the custodial parent asking to move hundreds or thousands of miles away from his or
her current location.”).
167
See Ericka Domarew, Michigan Keeps it Within Limits: Relocating No More than “100 Miles”,
20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 547, 563–65 (2003) (stating that Michigan legislators believed a distance
of less than 100 miles allowed a non-custodial parent to have access to his or her children).
168
545 N.W.2d 828, 832 (S.D. 1996); see also Howe v. Howe, 471 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1991)
(ﬁnding that 42-mile move within the state of Iowa could not be a basis for a material change of
circumstance warranting the modiﬁcation of custody).
169

Fossum, 545 N.W.2d at 832.

170

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

171

Curtis, 759 N.W.2d at 271.

172

Id. at 274.

173

Id. at 272.

174

Id. at 272.
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relocation cases is “whether the parent wishing to remove the child from the state
has a legitimate reason for leaving.”175 The mother’s reason for moving was to
live with her long-time boyfriend who was building a new home in Big Lake, a
fact which would clearly enhance the living conditions for her and her child.176
The appellate court noted that Nebraska has never found the desire to live with
a boyfriend to be a “legitimate reason” to relocate from the state.177 The appellate
court, in reversing the trial court’s decision to allow the move, stated:
[The trial court] focused on the fact that the move to Missouri
is less than 20 miles from Falls City. The short distance does
present a unique removal case in that most removal cases involve
the custodial parent asking to move hundreds or thousands of
miles away from his or her current location. However, no matter
the distance involved, we still must apply the well-established law
and determine if [the mother] met her burden to demonstrate a
legitimate reason for removing [the child] from Nebraska.
Under the circumstances revealed by the evidence in this
case, we conclude that [the mother’s] desire to continue living
with her current boyfriend is not a legitimate reason to remove
[the child] from Nebraska.178
The Nebraska Court of Appeals never considered the mother’s constitutionally
protected right to travel when it prohibited her from moving a few miles out of
state. Instead, the court relied on the mechanical, judicially created two-part test
which ﬁrst required the mother to prove a legitimate reason to leave the state.179
In Curtis, the father’s visitation would have remained the same if the mother
had moved 17.6 miles away. There was also no showing of any harm upon the
child due to the mother’s proposed move of 17.6 miles.180 Therefore, there was no

175

Id. at 273 (citing Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d at 592).

176

Curtis, 759 N.W.2d at 273.

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Jafari v. Jafari, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1979) (announcing for the ﬁrst time that a
custodial parent must have a “legitimate reason” to be allowed to relocate out of the state with minor
children). Subsequently, in Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d at 598–601, the Nebraska Supreme Court
created the current two-part test that a custodial parent must meet before being allowed to relocate
out of the state with the minor children. This test ﬁrst requires the custodial parent satisfy to the
court that he or she has a legitimate reason for leaving the state. Id. at 598. If the custodial parent
meets this initial threshold, then the custodial parent must also prove that removing the child from
Nebraska is in the child’s best interest. Id. at 599–601.
180

Curtis, 759 N.W.2d at 272. The only evidence the father presented regarding why he did
not want the child to relocate was because “all of [the child’s] family and friends are in Falls City, as
well as her school, and because Falls City is where she was born and has always lived.” Id.
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compelling state interest for the Nebraska Court of Appeals to prohibit the mother
from moving and the court’s ruling was a clear violation of her constitutionally
protected right to travel.
Statutory and judicially created tests, like that found in Curtis, require
a custodial parent to ﬁrst prove a legitimate reason to relocate before analyzing
the child’s best interest or the effect upon the non-custodial parent’s visitation.
For instance, in Curtis, the Nebraska Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the
mother’s petition to move 17.6 miles without even analyzing the compelling state
interests of protecting the best interest of the child or the non-custodial parent’s
visitation.181 Because maintaining the child in the jurisdiction is not a compelling
state interest which may infringe upon the parent’s right to travel, there is no
need for a parent to ﬁrst prove a “legitimate reason” to move out-of-state.182
Nebraska, Indiana, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts all have
unconstitutional statutory or judicially created tests, which unnecessarily impinge
upon the custodial parent’s right to travel when analyzing a custodial parent’s
desire to relocate with the minor children.183 These tests are unconstitutional
because they allow a court to deny the custodial parent’s ability to relocate for
reasons other than the best interest of the child or the effect of the move on the
non-custodial parent’s visitation.184 Simply, a court cannot prohibit a custodial

181
Id. at 274 (“Because [the mother] failed to satisfy the initial threshold of showing a
legitimate reason to move, it is not necessary for this court to determine if it is in [the child’s] best
interest to move to Missouri with [the mother].”).
182

See supra notes 99–118 and accompanying text.

IND. CODE § 31-17-2.2-5 (2008) (stating the best interests of the children are only analyzed
after the “relocating individual has [met] the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made
in good faith and for a legitimate reason”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:12 (2005) (stating that
the parent seeking permission to relocate must ﬁrst demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that the “relocation is for a legitimate purpose” and that the “proposed location is reasonable in
light of that purpose” before the trial court focuses on the best interests of the children); Ireland v.
Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 681 (Conn. 1998) (ﬁnding that the custodial parent ﬁrst bears the burden
of proving that the move is for a “legitimate purpose” before the best interests of the child regarding
the move are analyzed); Rosenthal v. Maney, 745 N.E.2d 350, 358 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001) (the
ﬁrst consideration before allowing a relocation is whether there is a “good reason” for the move);
Rosloniec v. Rosloniec, 773 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (“In order to prevail on a
motion to remove a minor child to another jurisdiction, the custodial parent must ﬁrst satisfy the
court that he or she has a legitimate reason for leaving the state.”). But see Bretherton v. Bretherton,
805 A.2d 766, 775 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“[T]he temptation [is] to end the inquiry when a
custodial parent intends to relocate without a legitimate purpose. That procedural stumbling block,
however, would thwart the overarching statutory mandate of the best interest of the child.”).
183

184

See, e.g., Wild v. Wild, 737 N.W.2d 882, 898 (2007) (ﬁnding that whether or not the
parent has a legitimate reason to leave the state is a “threshold matter for the court to determine
prior to evaluating the best interest factor”); Vagts v. Vagts, No. A-02-1055, 2004 WL 235040, at
*5 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2004) (not proceeding to conduct a best interest analysis since the trial
court found the custodial parent did not have a legitimate reason for seeking to remove the children
from the jurisdiction).
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parent from relocating and thus infringe upon his or her right to travel without
a compelling state interest, with the only two compelling state interests at issue
being the best interest of a child and the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights.185
Therefore, requiring a parent to prove a legitimate reason to relocate before other
compelling state interests are analyzed is blatantly unconstitutional.
Requiring a compelling state interest to prohibit a custodial parent from
relocating with the child, as well as striking down these “legitimate reason”
tests, is in harmony with the very purpose of the right to travel. This purpose
encompasses the right to “migrate, resettle, ﬁnd a new job, and start a new life.”186
Consequently, a custodial parent has the constitutional right to move for the
simple purpose of wanting to have a new beginning. Such was the case in Tomasko
v. Dubuc, where the custodial mother wanted to start a new life with her new
husband; she purchased a cattle ranch in Montana and requested the court allow
her to relocate.187 However, the Superior Court for the Northern Judicial District
of Hillsborough found the mother’s desire to start a cattle ranch in Montana
was not a “legitimate reason” to the leave the state of New Hampshire with her
child.188 Rulings like these are simply unconstitutional because a parent is only
allowed to leave a state if they meet certain pre-determined legitimate reasons
for moving, meaning a parent’s right to travel may be infringed upon without a
compelling state interest.189
Opposition to minor parental relocations should be put to an end. This can be
achieved by a court balancing a parent’s right to travel with the child’s best interest
and the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights. There have been several appellate
decisions demonstrating ridiculous attempts to prevent the custodial parent from
relocating short distances. For instance, there has been an attempt to prevent
the custodial mother from moving the children out of the marital home.190 In
185

See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974); supra Part II. But see
Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 614–16 (Wyo. 1999), where the Wyoming Supreme Court went too
far by making the right to travel absolute without considering the other compelling state interests of
the child’s best interest and the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights.
186

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629, overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).

187

761 A.2d 407, 408 (N.H. 2000).

188

Id. at 410.

189

See, e.g., Ireland, 717 A.2d at 682 (Conn. 1998) (citing examples of legitimate reasons to
relocate as being close to family, for health reasons, to protect the safety of the family, to pursue
employment or education opportunities, or to be with one’s spouse); Gerber, 407 N.W.2d at 503
(“Before a court will permit removal of a child from the jurisdiction, generally, a custodial parent
must establish that such removal is in the best interests of the child and must demonstrate that
departure from the jurisdiction is the reasonably necessary result of the custodial parent’s occupation,
a factually supported and reasonable expectation of improvement in the career or occupation of the
custodial parent, or required by the custodial parent’s remarriage.”).
190
Middlekauf v. Middlekauf, 390 A.2d 1202, 1205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (father
attempted to restrict the mother and the children to the former marital residence in Wyckoff, New
Jersey).
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Pennsylvania, a non-custodial father tried to preclude the custodial mother from
moving twenty-ﬁve miles within the same county.191 In other states, there are two
reported cases of non-custodial fathers suing custodial mothers over relocations
of four miles.192 Finally, there is a reported case in which a non-custodial father
attempted to prevent the custodial mother from moving to a location only 3.3
miles further from the father’s residence in New Castle, Pennsylvania.193 In such
cases where the geographical distance is not far enough to substantially alter the
relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent’s
constitutional right to travel should clearly prevail. Furthermore, in these minor
relocation cases, the court should also admonish the opposing non-custodial
parent by forcing the opposing parent to pay the custodial parent’s attorney fees
and costs for such an unreasonable opposition to the constitutional move.

CONCLUSION
Absent from a clear majority of courts’ analysis in relocation cases is the
consideration of the custodial parent’s right to travel.194 However, the United
States Supreme Court has clearly recognized a citizen’s constitutionally protected
right to travel, which includes the right to travel among states in order to “migrate,
resettle, ﬁnd a new job, and start a new life.”195 Citizens do not “check their
constitutional rights at the door” the day they become parents, thus, constitutional
rights should be considered in relocation cases.196
Courts often exclusively decide relocation cases based on the elusive best
interest of a child standard.197 Some of these courts also infuse the “legitimate
reason” test in the relocation analysis, usually ﬁnding it is a prerequisite that the
parent prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent has a legitimate
reason to leave the state before the court will even indulge in best interest of the child
analysis.198 However, courts must recognize they are ill-equipped to determine the
best interest of a child with any level of certainty.199 Courts must also recognize

191

Zoccole v. Zoccole, 751 A.2d 248, 249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).

192

Kellen v. Kellen, 367 N.W.2d 648, 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth ex rel.
Steiner v. Steiner, 390 A.2d 1326, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
193

Slagle v. Slagle, 1 Pa. D. & C.5th 44, 48 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2006).

194

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

195

See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.

196

See supra Part III.

197

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

198

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

199

See supra notes 152–56, 159 and accompanying text.
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that these “legitimate reason” tests are an unconstitutional infringement upon
the custodial parent’s right to travel, because keeping the child within the state
by itself is not a compelling state interest which may infringe upon the custodial
parent’s right to travel.200 By analyzing a custodial parent’s right to travel in the
context of relocations—recognizing that the only compelling state interests which
may infringe upon the parent’s right to travel are the best interest of the child
and the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights—absurd results like that found in
Curtis would be avoided.201 Furthermore, by recognizing a custodial parent’s right
to travel, more certainty would arise in relocation cases because a custodial parent
would only be prohibited from relocating upon a showing that the move would
either harm the child or substantially alter the relationship between the child and
the non-custodial parent.202

200

See supra Parts II(A) and III and accompanying text.

201

See supra Part III.

202

See supra Parts II(B)–(C) and III.
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